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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with the effects of aid transfers and their degree of 
volatility on economic growth. We develop a theoretical framework that 
distinguishes the allocation of foreign aid between productive and non-
productive uses. On the one hand, devoting aid inflows into productive public 
spending promotes growth while the related volatility has a damaging effect. 
On the other hand, the non-productive use of aid transfers has an adverse 
effect on growth while their volatility is growth-enhancing. The theoretical 
implications are supported by an empirical specification, formulated on similar 
grounds, for a panel of 74 aid-recipient countries over the time period from 
1972 to 1998. The empirical results are found to be robust in a variety of 
sensitivity tests.    
 
1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence on the interest of how foreign aid can 
affect economic growth – both by academic economists and policy makers alike. 
This renewed interest has been translated in a substantial number of both 
theoretical and empirical analyses, seeking to promote our understanding of the 
conditions under which aid could be effective (in terms of long-run 
macroeconomic performance) for recipient economies.
1  
                                                 
‡ Dimitrios Varvarigos gratefully acknowledges financial support from the ESRC. 
1 See World Bank 1998, Drazen 2000, Hansen and Tarp 2000, and Easterly 2003 for an overview 
of the issue.   2
   Empirically,  aid  effectiveness  has  been shown to depend crucially upon the 
characteristics of recipient countries – most notably on the degree of political and 
civil liberties (e.g., Svensson 1999), on the quality of policy making and 
institutions (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002), and on 
environmental factors (e.g., Guillamont and Chauvet 2001). At the theoretical 
level, authors have only recently begun to analyse the long-term effects of foreign 
aid in the context of endogenous growth models. Obstfeld (1999) finds that 
foreign aid given in the form of lump-sum transfers (i.e., non-productive aid) does 
not affect steady-state growth but increases the speed of convergence towards the 
balanced-growth path. Similar results, concerning this particular form of aid, are 
reached by Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2005). They 
argue, however, that when aid is tied to public investment projects (i.e., 
productive aid) then it is likely to stimulate steady-state growth. By including 
elastic labour supply, Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004) find that non-productive 
aid has adverse effects on economic growth.
2    
   All the above analyses share a common feature – mainly, their silence on the 
issue of variability in foreign aid transfers and the implications that may arise 
from it. Nevertheless, in recent empirical studies, Palage and Robe (2001) and 
Bulir and Hamann (2003) have documented that aid is highly volatile. 
Furthermore, Lensink and Morrissey (2000) show evidence that the variability of 
aid transfers is damaging for the growth prospects of recipient economies. Indeed, 
in light of recent stochastic, dynamic general equilibrium models (e.g., Blackburn 
and Galindev 2003; Blackburn and Pelloni 2004; Canton 2002; de Hek 1999) and 
empirical analyses (e.g., Ramey and Ramey 1995; Kneller and Young 2001; 
                                                 
2  Other theoretical analyses link foreign aid with the macroeconomic environment, without 
focusing on the issue of long-run growth. Boone (1996) argues that, depending on the prevailing 
political regime, foreign aid can induce the government to either reduce domestic taxation or 
increase lump-sum transfers. Svensson (2000) shows that, by inducing an increase in rent-
extracting activities (associated with the presence of corruption in the recipient economy), higher 
aid receipts can actually reduce the provision of productive public goods and services. Asiedu and 
Villamil (2002) show how different kinds of foreign assistance may alleviate the underinvestment 
problem that may arise when the enforcement of debt contracts in international financial markets 
is imperfect.       3
Martin and Rogers 2000), that show how and why different kinds of variability 
may affect long-run growth, there is no reason to preclude the possibility that 
foreign aid volatility may be an additional and important factor on the 
determination of aid effectiveness.     
      The present analysis is concerned with highlighting, both theoretically and 
empirically, the additional repercussions emerging for the foreign aid-economic 
growth nexus when variability in foreign assistance is taken under consideration – 
an issue that, so far, has eluded the attention of researchers. The novelty of our 
approach on examining the growth effects of foreign aid is twofold. It lies on 
explicitly taking account of both the provision of foreign financial assistance and 
its volatility, and on considering how these effects can be qualified in relation to 
the allocation of aid transfers between productive and non-productive uses. 
Another innovation of our paper is that our empirical specification is based upon 
and guided by results derived from a dynamic general equilibrium model.  
   Our theoretical framework is described by an analytically-tractable, stochastic 
growth model in which the accumulation of human capital provides the 
underlying source of endogenous productivity improvements (e.g., Lucas 1988; 
Razin 1972; Uzawa 1965).
3 The dynamic process for human capital depends on 
the resources the individuals devote for this purpose and on the provision of 
productive public goods by the government. In this environment, the government 
receives an inflow of foreign transfers which allocates between productive (i.e., 
augmentation of productive public goods provision) and non-productive (i.e., 
lump-sum income transfers) uses. However, these transfers are not stable through 
time. Instead, they are characterised by some degree of variability. 
      As it turns out, taking account of aid variability results in additional and 
important implications for the determination of the relative effectiveness (in 
terms of growth performance) of foreign aid. Specifically, the results we obtain 
indicate that the impact of aid on long-run growth depends critically on the use 
                                                 
3 Obstfeld (1999) argued that the education sector is one of the most important channels through 
which the impact of foreign aid can be translated into substantial growth effects. To the best of 
our knowledge, our study is the first to examine the aid induced growth dynamics when aid 
augments the process of human capital accumulation.   4
of these inflows by recipient governments and on how volatile is their supply by 
the donors. Our results are classified in two different scenarios. When aid is used 
unproductively, it has, on average, a negative effect on growth as a result of an 
income effect that distorts human capital investment decisions and discourages 
individuals from engaging in productivity-promoting activities.
4 At the same 
time, however, aid volatility induces a precautionary motive, leading individuals 
to increase the resources they devote for human capital investment – an effect 
that stimulates growth. When aid is used productively, it promotes growth, on 
average, by increasing the amount of productivity-enhancing public spending. In 
this case, however, aid volatility dampens growth due to the diminishing returns 
of public spending in the technology describing human capital improvements. 
   Our  empirical  specification  is  formulated, with this background in mind, in 
order to assess the predictions of our theoretical model. For this purpose, we 
utilise a panel of 74 aid-recipient countries over the sample period from 1972 to 
1998, by considering three nine-year periods that correspond to three different 
decades. Our regressions include interaction terms in order to distinguish the 
effects of productive versus unproductive aid in relation to both its mean and its 
volatility. In addition, we test whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of 
control variables that previous growth regressions have qualified as empirically 
important. The results are strongly in support of the implications of the 
theoretical model. Furthermore, these results are robust to a wide range of 
sensitivity tests, including panels of different period. 
   The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 lays out the theoretical 
framework and derives the results concerning the impact of foreign aid, and its 
volatility, on the rate of output growth. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
                                                 
4 In our model, crucial for the result that non-productive aid affects growth is the assumption of 
leisure-education choice by individuals. In this respect, we obtain the result of Chatterjee and 
Turnovsky (2004) through a different mechanism – i.e., the impact on human capital 
accumulation. In their model there is no human capital, however they obtain a negative effect by 
allowing to individuals a leisure-labour choice. Unproductive aid induces individuals to reduce 
their labour supply, an effect that dampens growth due to the scale effect that labour has in the 
class of “AK” type production functions – a class to which the production function they use in 
their model effectively reduces to.      5
methodology and describes the data. In Section 4, we present our basic results 
and conduct the robustness testing. Section 5 concludes.             
 
2. Theory 
In this section, we build a simple stochastic growth model, the results of which 
will provide the basic assumptions that we test in the empirical analysis of our 
paper. We use a representative agent framework in which individuals produce a 
perishable commodity and spend resources for improving human capital (or 
productivity in general), and the government spends resources with the purpose 
of providing productivity-enhancing public goods and services. Besides domestic 
resources (i.e., through income taxation), each period the government receives 
(random) foreign aid stipends which it allocates between lump-sum income 
transfers and the provision of productive public spending.        
 
2.1 The Basic Framework 
Time is measured in discrete intervals, i.e.,  0,1... t = ∞. We consider an artificial 
economy populated by a large number of homogeneous producers-consumers. For 
simplicity, population growth is assumed to be zero and, without loss of 
generality, the total population size is normalised to unity. At the beginning of 
each period, a representative agent is endowed with  1 N >  units of time. She 
utilises a constant returns production technology through which she produces  t y  
units of the economy’s single commodity by combining a fixed amount of time, 
normalised to unity, together with her human capital stock, denoted by  t h .
5 
Formally, 
 
  . tt yh =  [1] 
 
                                                 
5 The assumption that human capital is the only variable input in output production has been 
used by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Palivos (2001) and Cardak (2004) among others.    6
The remaining  1 TN = −  units of time are allocated between activities that 
increase the agent’s human capital (formal education, research, training etc.), 
denoted by  t e , and leisure, denoted by  t l . Therefore,  
 
  . tt elT +=  [2] 
 
   The process governing human capital accumulation is given by 
 
 
1
1 ( ) , >0,  (0,1). tt t t he h g
ξξ ξ
−
+ = ΞΞ ∈  [3] 
 
The above expression illustrates the two underlying sources of endogenous 
productivity improvements in the economy. On the one hand, an agent can 
combine  t e  units of her available time together with her existing level of 
knowledge,  t h , to increase her future human capital. On the other hand, publicly 
provided goods and services (e.g., on education, infrastructure, transportation 
etc.), denoted by  t g , can enhance the process of learning by increasing the 
efficiency through which private inputs are transformed into human capital. In 
this context,  t g  represents aggregate public spending on goods and services that 
are non-rival and non-excludable. It is also assumed that when the agent 
maximises her utility she does not internalise the benefits accrued from the 
provision of public spending. 
   The individual derives lifetime utility according to the following  
 
  []
0
log( ) , >0,
t
tt
t
Uc l βδ δ
∞
=
=+ ∑  [4] 
 
where  t c  denotes consumption and  (0,1) β ∈  is a discount factor.
6 
                                                 
6 In this model, logarithmic preferences for consumption are essential for the derivation of closed-
form solutions. The assumption of linearity in the preferences for leisure follows Hansen (1985). It 
is innocuous for the results of the paper, however, and used purely for computational simplicity. 
It can be shown that, qualitatively, the same results apply for any increasing and concave 
function of leisure.     7
   With the purpose of introducing foreign aid in our model, we assume that each 
period a foreign donor (a country, a group of countries or an international 
organisation) provides an income transfer to the economy equal to  t A , measured 
in units of domestic output.
7 Following Chatterjee et al (2003) and Chatterjee 
and Turnovsky (2005), it is further assumed that a fraction  [0,1] ζ ∈  of this aid 
inflow is provided to the private sector of the economy in the form of lump-sum 
income transfers (non-productive, or pure, aid) while the remaining fraction 
(1 ) [0,1] ζ −∈  is used to enhance the provision of productive public goods and 
services, together with domestic resources available through income taxation 
(productive, or tied, aid). Without any loss of generality, we will assume that 
revenues from income taxation are used exclusively for the production of public 
goods, while the only source for financing lump-sum transfers comes from foreign 
aid inflows.
8 Given these assumptions, the private sector’s and the public sector’s 
budget constraints are given, respectively, by the following expressions 
 
 (1 ) , tt t cy A τζ = − +  [5] 
 (1 ) , tt t gy A τζ =+ −  [6] 
 
where  (0,1) τ ∈  denotes the constant, marginal tax rate imposed by the 
government on the private sector’s income. 
   Our focus is to examine the effects of foreign aid along an equilibrium path 
with sustainable long-run growth. Such an equilibrium requires that the total aid 
disbursements are proportional to the recipient’s GDP. Hence, we assume that 
                                                 
7 A valid criticism to such an assumption has to do with the unlikelihood that, in reality, foreign 
aid inflows will remain permanent. However, this assumption has been used in the vast majority 
of dynamic models assessing the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid (e.g., Boone 1996; 
Chatterjee et al 2003; Chatterjee and Turnovsky 2005; Obstfeld 1999; Svensson 1999).  
8 Qualitatively, the results would be identical had we taken a more general approach by allowing 
both sources of government revenues to finance lump-sum transfers, i.e., by assuming that 
()
tt t TRANSFERS y A ητ =+  and  (1 )( )
tt t gy A ητ = − +  where η (1 η − ) is the share of 
government resources provided to the private sector as lump-sum income transfers (enhancement 
of productive goods and services). The reason for not following this assumption is that our focus 
is solely on the composition of foreign aid receipts.          8
 
 . tt t Ay α =  [7] 
 
Our point of departure from other analyses is that, in order to introduce aid 
volatility, we assume that { } 0 t t α
∞
=  is a sequence of identically and independently 
distributed random variables. In order to maintain analytical tractability, we 
specify a simple probability distribution whereby 
 
 {} {} 0 . 5 , tt prob prob αα σ αα σ = − == + =    [8] 
 
where  α  is used as a measure of the expected or average level of foreign aid 
inflows and σ  is an indicator of foreign aid volatility.
9 We impose the restriction 
ασ ≥   to ensure that aid receipts are nonnegative.  
 
2.2 Dynamic General Equilibrium  
The general equilibrium in this economy can be obtained by combining the 
assumptions of the previous section together with the first order conditions 
associated with the maximisation problem of the individual, whose objective is to 
choose sequences for {}0 t t c
∞
= ,  { } 0 t t e
∞
=  and {} 1 0 t t h
∞
+ =  as to maximise the expected 
value of her lifetime utility, given in [4], subject to sequences for [1], [2], [3] and 
[5]. When maximising her lifetime utility, the representative agent takes the 
sequences of {}0 t t g
∞
=  and {} 0 t t A
∞
=  as given.  
   The first order conditions for the above problem are given as follows 
 
 
1
, t
t c
λ =  [9] 
 
11 () , tt t t t eh hg
ξξ δψ ξ
−− = Ξ  [10] 
                                                 
9 We use α   and σ  as measures for average aid and aid volatility, respectively, as in equilibrium 
the long-run rate of output growth depends solely on the foreign aid to output ratio, 
t α , rather 
than on the actual level of aid inflows, 
t A . The randomness in  t α  is meant to capture the 
empirically observed fact that in many instances, the variability in foreign aid provision is higher 
than the variability on the recipient economy’s GDP (e.g., Pallage and Robe 2001).     9
 
11
11 1 1 1 1 () ( 1 ) ( ) , tt t t t t t t t Ee h e g E
ξξ ψβ ξ ψ β τλ
−−
++ + + + +  = Ξ + −   [11] 
 
where  t λ  and  t ψ  are the Lagrange multipliers associated with [5] and [3] 
respectively and  t E  is the conditional expectations operator. Equation [9] is the 
familiar condition equating the shadow value of wealth with the marginal utility 
of consumption. Equation [10] is the static optimality condition, equating the 
marginal cost with the marginal benefit of an increase in the amount of time the 
individual devotes to activities that increase her human capital. Finally, equation 
[11] is the dynamic optimality condition, equating the marginal cost with the 
marginal benefit of an increase in the levels of human capital.  
   We begin the solution to the model by multiplying both sides of equation [11] 
by  1 t h +  and substituting equations [1] and [9]. It yields 
 
 
1
11 2
1
() ( 1 ) .
t
tt t t t t
t
y
hE h E
c
ψβ ξ ψ β τ
+
++ +
+
    =+ −      
 [12]   
 
Substituting [7] in the private sector’s budget constraint, given in [5], and 
dividing both sides with  t y  yields 
 
  1.
t
t
t
c
y
τζ α = − +  [13] 
 
Now, substitute [13] in [12] to get 
 
  11 2
1
1
() ( 1 ) .
1
tt t t t t
t
hE h E ψβ ξ ψ β τ
τζ α
++ +
+
    =+ −      − + 
 [14] 
 
The expression in [14] reveals that the provision of aid in the form of pure 
transfers affects the private sector’s incentives relative to its human capital 
accumulation decisions, as it is clear by the presence of  1 t α +  inside the second 
expectations term on the right hand side of [14].  
   Recall  that  given  [8],  the sequence of random variables { } 0 t t α
∞
=  generate 
constant mean and variance. Therefore, the second term on the right hand side of   10
[14] is a constant. Given this, let  1 (1 ) [1/(1 )] tt E βτ τ ζ α + −− + ≡Θ. As the random 
variables have the i.i.d. property, we can substitute Θ back in [14] which then 
takes the form of a stochastic difference equation which can be solved with the 
method of repeated substitution. A solution consistent with the transversality 
condition on human capital,  1 lim( ) ( ) 0 tt t Eh βξ ψ
Τ
+Τ +Τ+ Τ→∞ = , is given by  
 
  1 ,
1
tt h ψ
βξ
+
Θ
=
−
 [15] 
 
recalling that  1 (1 ) [1/(1 )] tt E βτ τ ζ α + Θ = −− + . The solution in [15] can be 
verified by direct substitution back in equation [14].  
   Given [3], the first order condition in [10] can be written as  
 
 
1 .
tt
t
h
e
ξψ
δ
+ =  [16] 
 
Substituting [15] in [16], solving for  t e  and using the expression for Θ yields 
 
 
1
(1 ) 1
.
(1 ) 1
tt
t
eE
βξ τ
δβ ξ τ ζ α +
 −    =      −− + 
 [17] 
 
Using the properties of the specified probability distribution for {} 0 t t α
∞
=  we can 
write the expectations term inside the brackets as  
  22
1
11
.
1( 1 ) ( )
t
t
E
τζ α
τ ζα τ ζα ζσ +
 − +    =      − + − + − 

  [18] 
Substitution back in [17] yields the equilibrium solution for learning activities,  t e , 
as 
  22
(1 )(1 )
(;) .
(1 )[(1 ) ( ) ]
t ee
βξ τ τ ζα
ασ
δβ ξ τ ζ α ζ σ
−− +
= ≡
−− + −


  [19] 
 
From the above equation we can establish that  1() 0 e ⋅ <  and  2() 0 e ⋅ > . Ceteris 
paribus, an increase on the average level of foreign aid reduces the time 
individuals spend for learning activities while an increase in foreign aid volatility 
increases the time resources spent for this purpose. The intuition behind these   11
results is the following: current learning decisions yield benefits in the future as 
they affect next period’s human capital and output. As these benefits include, 
among other factors, the future income transfers the individual receives, a crucial 
aspect on learning decisions are the expectations individuals form about future 
outcomes. Consider an increase in α . For the individual, this corresponds to an 
increase in the income transfer she expects to receive in the next period. When 
deciding her learning activities today, she understands that her consumption next 
period, when the benefits from higher human capital are reaped, will be higher 
because of the expected increase in her available resources. As a result, the 
marginal utility of her future consumption will be lower. The individual finds 
optimal to act as to increase her future marginal utility back to the level dictated 
by her optimal decisions. She can achieve this by reducing the time she spends in 
learning activities, as such a response will lead to lower human capital 
accumulation and, consequently, lower output and consumption in the future. 
   Now consider an increase in σ . From equations [5], [9] and [14] we can see that 
the future marginal utility of consumption, which partially determines the 
marginal benefits of higher human capital, depends on the expected value of a 
convex function of the random variable  1 t α + . Therefore, it is increasing in a 
mean-preserving spread (higher σ ) in the distribution of this random variable.
10 
The individual will act as to decrease her future marginal utility of consumption 
back to her optimising choice. This can be achieved by devoting more time in 
education, a decision that will enhance the accumulation of human capital and, 
subsequently, will lead to increased output and consumption. Intuitively, an 
increase in σ  is associated with higher income uncertainty, to which individuals 
respond by resorting to “precautionary” investment in human capital. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 We appeal to the well known result whereby the expected value of a concave (convex) function 
of a random variable is decreased (increased) by a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of 
the random variable (Jensen’s inequality).    12
2.3 Trend Growth 
In this section we obtain the long-run growth rate of output and show how this is 
affected by different aspects of foreign aid, i.e., its mean and volatility. We begin 
by substituting [7] in [6] and factorising with  t y  to get  
 
 [( 1) ] . tt t gy τζ α =+−  [20] 
 
Now, we can substitute [1] and [20] in [3] and divide both sides with  t y  in order 
to get the following growth rate for output 
 
 
1 1
1 [( 1) ] ,
t
tt t
t
y
e
y
ξξ τζ αγ
− +
+ = Ξ + −≡  [21] 
 
where  t e  is actually constant in equilibrium as obtained in equation [19]. It is 
evident, from equation [21], that the growth rate will vary with different 
realisations of  t α . As this model includes a stochastic element, the actual growth 
rate becomes effectively a random variable with different realisations each period 
according to different realisations of  t α . To obtain the long-run, or trend, growth 
rate of output, γ  , we need to take account of the statistical properties for the 
distribution of  t α , given in [8], to compute the mean value of the growth rate. 
Taking expectations on [21] and substituting [19] yields 
 
  [] [] {}
11
22
1
(1 )( ) (1 )( ) ,
(1 ) ( )
ξ
ξξ τζ α
γτ ζ α σ τ ζ α σ
τζ α ζ σ
−−  − +  = Ζ + −− ++− +  − + − 

 
 [22] 
 
where  [( 1 ) ] / 2 [ ( 1 ) ]
ξ ξ βξ τ δ βξ Ζ = Ξ− −. Clearly, the growth trend in the recipient 
economy is affected by both the expected value, α , and the volatility, σ , of 
foreign aid inflows as measured by the aid-to-output ratio.  
   The growth rate in [22] reveals that, ceteris paribus, the impact of an increase 
in both the average level of aid inflows and in the degree of aid volatility depends 
crucially on the parameter ζ  which determines the composition of foreign aid, 
i.e., whether aid disbursements are distributed to agents in the form of income   13
transfers or used to expand the level of productive spending. To make the 
argument more transparent, we can treat ζ  as a binary (or indicator) parameter 
and consider the two extremes in which either  1 ζ =  (unproductive aid) or  0 ζ =  
(productive aid). In the first scenario ( 1 ζ = ), we have  0
γ
α
∂
<
∂

  and  0
γ
σ
∂
>
∂

 
meaning that a lower average value and a higher volatility for the aid to GDP 
ratio will lead to higher trend growth. In this case, the effects of foreign aid, with 
respect to both its mean and volatility, do not have any impact through the 
provision of public spending as the entire amount of aid receipts are distributed 
to individuals as lump-sum transfers. Instead, the effects of foreign aid are 
derived solely through its effect on the learning decisions of individuals. Given 
this, the intuition of why the mean and the volatility of aid affect trend growth 
in such a direction can be readily provided by appealing to the analysis and 
arguments of the previous section which shows the effects of aid inflows on the 
time resources that the private sector’s agents spend on accumulating human 
capital.  
   Now consider the second scenario ( 0 ζ = ). In that case one gets  0
γ
α
∂
>
∂

  and 
0
γ
σ
∂
<
∂

 meaning that a higher average value and a lower volatility for the aid to 
GDP ratio will lead to increased trend growth. Contrary to the previous case, 
when foreign aid is used solely as to expand the productive capacity of the 
recipient economy by enhancing public spending, then the time resources 
individual’s devote to human capital accumulation remain unresponsive to both 
changes on average aid provision and to the degree of its variability.
11 In this 
case, foreign aid impinges on trend growth solely by affecting productive 
spending. Intuitively, the positive growth effect of α  is merely a result of the 
increase on the average level of productive spending that results from an increase 
on average aid inflows. The negative growth effect of σ  is the result of the 
concavity of the temporary growth rate, in [21], with respect to the random 
                                                 
11 Check that for  0 ζ = , the optimal solution for learning in [19] becomes ˆ
(1 )
e
βξ
δβ ξ
=
−
.    14
variable  t α .
12 Diminishing returns with respect to public inputs in [3], imply that 
the increase in knowledge (and growth) resulting from a temporary increase of 
productive aid is less pronounced than the decrease in human capital (and 
growth) from a temporary decrease of productive aid. This means that, on 
average, higher aid volatility will be associated with lower trend output growth. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
Summarising the results of the previous section, our model provides a link 
between the utilisation of aid in productive versus unproductive purposes and its 
respective volatility, providing clear implications regarding the growth process. 
Our focus now turns to the issue of examining these theoretical predictions with 
empirical testing. 
   To test the effect of aid and its volatility on economic growth, first we need to 
classify the use of aid flows by the recipient government into productive and 
unproductive. This distinction is based upon the type of expenditures which are 
partially financed by aid inflows. This, in turn, requires the classification of 
government spending into productive and unproductive. In this framework, we 
empirically assess the effects of productive and unproductive aid and aid 
volatility on economic growth, through the interaction effects of productive and 
unproductive government spending with aid and its volatility, respectively. The 
grouping of government spending follows the taxonomy used by Bleaney et al. 
(2001) and Kneller et al. (1999) who consider spending to be productive when it 
incorporates “a substantial (physical or human) capital component” (Kneller et 
al. 1999, page 178). The classification of government expenditures into these two 
categories is presented in Table A1. 
   We begin our empirical specification by examining a simple regression, in the 
spirit of Lensink and Morrissey (2000), which involves the effect of aid and its 
volatility on the rate of economic growth 
  01 1 log , it it it it it g gdp aid volaid αβ γ δ ε =+ + + +  [23] 
                                                 
12 See footnote 6.    15
where  it g  denotes the average rate of growth of per capita GDP in country i at 
time  t , log it gdp  represents the log of initial level of per capita GDP, 
it aid describes the aid-to-GDP ratio, and  it volaid  measures the volatility of aid as 
the standard deviation of the aid-to-GDP ratio at each time interval.
13 
      The next step is to test the implications of our theoretical framework and 
assess the link between productive and unproductive aid with growth, and the 
volatility of productive and unproductive aid with growth through interaction 
effects: 
 
22
0
11
2
1
log ( exp ) ( exp )
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where expk  represents the vector of the two types of government spending. 
   In the final step, we expand the set of control variables with the vector X , 
which consists of variables that have been identified in previous studies as 
important conditioning variables in growth regressions: 
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These variables are the budget deficit, trade, dummies for East Asian countries 
and countries that are located in the tropics, and the log of initial life 
expectancy. In addition, all regressions account for common deterministic trends 
by incorporating dummies for the different time periods. The above specifications 
are estimated originally with OLS, and then with GMM in order to account for 
possible endogeneity of the regressors. With the latter method, the validity of the 
instruments is tested with Hansen’s J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions and 
                                                 
13 The standard deviation of a variable is commonly used as a measure of its volatility. See, 
among others, Ramey and Ramey (1995), Beck, Lundberg, and Majnoni (2001), and Aghion, 
Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2005) for studies that calculate the volatility of output. In a 
later section, we examine alternative aid volatility measures to examine the current measure’s 
robustness.   16
the difference C-statistic of additional moment conditions, whenever these are 
incorporated.
14 
   Our data set comprises panel data for 74 aid recipient countries over the period 
1972-1998.
15 Most of the data are drawn from two different sources. Government 
expenditure data come from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
Government Finance Statistics, while the majority of the data are from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The sample is chosen as the longest 
time period for which all variables are available for the widest selection of 
countries. Details on the description and the sources of the variables can be found 
in the Appendix. Although the data are based on annual observations, we remove 
the effects of the business cycle and extract the relevant long-run information by 
taking three nine-year time intervals (1972-80, 1981-89, 1990-98).
16 This is a 
standard approach in the recent panel data growth literature which allows an 
easy comparison with previous studies. Summary statistics for the data set can be 
found in Table 1. 
  
4. Empirical Findings 
This section conducts the estimation analysis and reports the results of the 
relationship between the different uses of aid receipts, their volatility, and 
economic growth. First, we present the basic results as specified by equations 
[23]-[25], and then we undertake a wide range of tests to examine their robustness 
                                                 
14 Hansen’s J-test is preferred over the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, since, unlike 
the latter, it is consistent in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Roodman 
2004). 
15 The countries involved are listed in the Appendix. 
16 Later we test the validity of our results for different periodizations. We use nine-year intervals 
as our benchmark, however, because we want to strike a balance between a shorter period 
appropriate to capture the growth effect of some types of aid-financed government spending (such 
as infrastructure and public services), and a longer period which is likely to capture the effects of 
the remaining productive spending (e.g., health and education), and to better assess the impact of 
aid volatility on growth.   17
for different specifications, definitions, time periodizations, and expenditure 
classifications. 
 
4.1 Basic Results 
Table 2 summarizes the basic findings. The first column depicts the homogeneous 
effects of aid and aid volatility on growth, thus verifying the result first 
illustrated by Lensink and Morrissey (2000) – mainly, that aid significantly 
influences growth in a positive way while the volatility of aid inhibits growth.
17 
Column 2 allows the empirical link between aid, aid volatility, and growth to 
vary depending on the use of aid by the recipient governments. These 
heterogeneous effects are captured by the multiplicative terms between each type 
of government spending (productive/unproductive) with aid inflows and their 
respective volatility. The results exhibit a reasonably good fit, with the estimated 
interaction effects being in accordance with the predictions of our theoretical 
framework. In particular, we find that aid disbursements used for productive 
purposes have a positive effect on growth, while unproductive use of them 
reduces growth. In addition, the volatility of aid is found to hurt growth only 
when aid is used productively. When aid is used unproductively, higher volatility 
of aid disbursements is associated with higher growth. 
   Column 3 adds a set of conditioning variables found by many studies to be 
important determinants of growth. These consist of the budget deficit and trade 
as indicators of fiscal and trade policy (e.g., Hansen and Tarp 2000; Dalgaard et 
al. 2004), an intercept indicating the idiosyncrasy of tropical locations (e.g., 
Daalgard  et al. 2004; Clemens et al. 2004), a dummy representing the fast-
growing East Asian countries, and the log of initial life expectancy to proxy for 
health conditions (e.g., Clemens et al. 2004). The interaction effects of aid, aid 
volatility, and growth remain intact, while the signs of the additional controls are 
as expected. Specifically, larger budget deficits and location in the tropics 
adversely affect growth, whereas economies that are more open, with higher life 
                                                 
17 Pallage and Robe (2001) have raised a similar argument regarding the volatility of aid. They 
find the pattern of aid disbursements to be highly procyclical. This, by intensifying the volatility 
of output, may result in lower growth.   18
expectancy, and located in East Asia are related with higher growth rates. In 
addition, initial GDP per capita now implies income convergence effects. 
      The results presented so far, although consistent with our theoretical 
illustration, may be biased by the possible endogeneity of foreign aid. To 
overcome such a problem, we make use of an instrumental variable approach and 
estimate the growth equation with GMM. The list of instruments we employ for 
the multiplicative terms incorporating aid and volatility of aid are provided in 
the table notes.
18  
   Column 4 shows that the results already obtained with OLS are not due to 
reverse causation running from growth to aid. The Hansen J-statistic supports 
this result since it does not reject the hypothesis that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term. In addition, the reported p-values for the 
standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, as they are 
clustered by country, giving more confidence to our results. Finally, to account 
for possible endogeneity of the remaining conditioning variables – namely, the 
budget deficit, trade, productive and unproductive expenditures, and initial per 
capita GDP – we augment the instruments set with one-period lagged values of 
trade and initial GDP per capita, and GDP squared interacted with both 
productive and unproductive public expenditures. The results remain intact, with 
the conditioning variables jointly explaining 69% of the growth variability, while 
both the Hansen J-test and the C-statistic are strongly satisfied. Therefore, we 
can conclude that the estimated coefficients are not due to reverse causation, 
weak instruments, omitted variables, or an artifact of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  
 
 
                                                 
18 The choice of instruments follows the related literature and draws largely from Hansen and 
Tarp (2001), Dalgaard et al. (2004), and Clemens et al. (2004). However, to ensure that the 
number of instruments is not too large, we follow Roodman (2004) and restrict the number of 
instruments not to be greater than the number of countries in the regression. Otherwise, the 
instruments may overfit the instrumented variables and bias the results towards those obtained 
with OLS.   19
4.2 Robustness Tests 
Until recently, very few studies exploring the impact of aid on growth have 
examined the broader applicability of their results by means of robustness 
testing. However, the studies of Easterly (2003), Easterly et al. (2004), and 
Roodman (2004) have demonstrated that most of the recent empirical results are 
susceptible to changes in specification, definition of variables, alternative 
periodizations, dataset expansion, and influential observations. To account for 
such considerations, we investigate in this section the sensitivity of our results to 
a number of alterations along these proposed lines. 
 
4.2.1 Testing the specification 
Table 3 shows the regression results when we expand the vector X  by alternate 
inclusion of a number of additional control variables. These variables include 
ethnic fractionalization indicating political instability (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 
2000), civil war and its lag representing the disruption of normal life and the 
return to it (e.g., Clemens et al. 2004), population growth rate, money as an 
indicator of financial depth (e.g., Dalgaard and Hansen 2001), initial fertility 
rate, an intercept for Latin American countries, and, finally, aid squared to 
examine whether aid exhibits diminishing returns (e.g., Hansen and Tarp 2000, 
2001). 
   Controlling for these additional factors does not alter the observed conditional 
relationships between aid, aid volatility, and growth (the only insignificance 
seems to appear with the interaction effects of unproductive spending when 
money is added into the regression). All the additional controls have the expected 
sign, with the last regression showing that aid does not have a declining effect on 
growth. Finally, note that Hansen’s J-statistic, the C-statistic, and Shea’s partial 
R
2 confirm the validity of the instruments set. 
 
4.2.2 Testing the volatility measure 
The volatility measure we use to examine the pattern of aid disbursements 
although widely acceptable, is not unique. Palage and Robe (2001) and Buliř and   20
Hamann (2003) have calculated the volatility of aid as the standard deviation of 
its cyclical component, where the latter has been obtained by de-trending the aid 
series with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. To examine the sensitivity of our results 
to alternative aid volatility measures, we use three additional definitions. Their 
description and measurement can be found in the Appendix. Table 4 reports 
estimates based on these alternative definitions of the volatility of aid. Column 1 
reproduces the regression with our original volatility measure from Table 2 to 
ease comparison, while the remaining columns adopt the new definitions. It 
becomes apparent that the multiplicative terms entailing the volatility of aid are 
sensitive in the choice of definition, in terms of both size and significance, 
although they retain the predicted sign. The results, however, remain largely 
robust for the two preferred volatility measures found in the literature and 
portrayed here in Columns 1 and 2. 
 
4.2.3 Testing the periodization 
It has become a standard procedure in cross-country growth regressions to use 
time period averages to capture the long-run effects of the conditioning variables 
on economic growth. In the aid-growth literature, almost all of the studies use 
either four-year or five-year periods, with the exception of Guillamont and 
Chauvet (2001), who use twelve-year averages. Recently, however, Easterly 
(2003) and Roodman (2004) have shown that different periodizations can 
significantly alter the results of the most prominent empirical studies (e.g., 
Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dehn 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 
Collier and Dollar 2002). To encounter such an issue in this study, we consider 
two alternative time period averages, 4-year and 27-year (pure cross-section).  
   Table 5 shows that our results remain unchanged by altering the periodization 
of the regression implying that increasing or decreasing the period averaging does 
not affect statistical significance. However, we observe that both the statistical 
power and the magnitude of the interaction effects differ across periodizations. In 
particular, the cross-section regression depicts the strongest significance (one 
percent) and the highest absolute values in the interaction aid effects, while the 
4-year panel reports the lowest significance (ten percent) and the highest values   21
in the multiplicative aid-volatility effects. Our benchmark 9-year period results lie 
in between these two extremes, making us more confident of their validity. 
 
4.2.4 Testing the sample of recipients 
The next test we undertake is to re-examine the basic results for two country 
sub-samples, based on the fact that the country sample we use cannot be 
regarded as a homogeneous country grouping. Therefore, it is possible the effect 
of aid on growth to differ in magnitude and significance for different sub-samples. 
Table 6 evaluates our econometric specification for a sub-sample of 35 low-income 
countries and 37 low-aid recipient countries, respectively. The first sub-sample is 
comprised by countries that are grouped as low-income and low-upper income by 
the World Bank, while the second sub-sample consists of the countries that have 
aid receipts smaller than the sample average. Both columns in Table 6 show that 
neither the sign nor the significance of the interaction effects change. However, 
although the magnitude of the effects remains unchanged for the low-income 
sample, it uniformly rises by a scale of ten for the low-aid recipient’s sample. 
This result could imply the greater marginal effect aid has on growth if it is 
received in small amounts, representing possible coordination difficulties or the 
presence of corruption related with bigger amounts of aid receipts.
19 
 
4.2.5 Testing the expenditures classification 
Finally, we need to acknowledge that the types of expenditure we have 
aggregated as being productive, do not necessarily have the same impact on 
economic growth when they are partially financed with aid. To address this 
point, we separate education expenditures, health expenditures, and 
transportation and communication expenditures from the rest of productive 
expenditures to examine whether there is a particular type of aid-financed 
spending that is most influential for growth.  
                                                 
19 The second link is empirically supported by Alesina and Weder (2002) and Svensson (2000) 
who find that increases in aid cause more corruption.   22
   The results in Table 7, and in particular the instrumented regressions, suggest 
that the only category of productive government spending financed with aid that 
significantly promotes growth is expenditures in education. This result accords 
well with our theoretical illustration and with the findings of Miller and Russek 
(1997), Bleaney et al. (2001) and Bose et al. (2003), who report positive growth 
effects of government expenditures in education (the first two studies for 
developed countries and the third for developing countries). Furthermore, the 
volatility of aid flows used in the education sector have a negative effect on 
growth – a result consistent with our previous findings. The remaining categories 
of productive spending financed with aid, show either a zero (transportation and 
communication) or a negative correlation with growth (health and rest of 
spending).
20  
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper has been to evaluate the relationship between foreign 
aid and economic growth. Our contribution lies on identifying, both theoretically 
and empirically, the volatility of aid inflows – documented by the studies of 
Palage and Robe (2001) and Bulir and Hamann (2003) – as an additional factor 
on the determination of the growth effects generated by the provision of aid. 
Moreover, we distinguish the effects of aid transfers and their volatility according 
to whether foreign resource inflows are utilised for financing productive or non-
productive public spending. 
      The general conclusion emerging from our analysis can be summarised as 
follows: when aid is used productively (unproductively) it has, on average, a 
positive (negative) effect on growth while its respective volatility has a negative 
(positive) growth effect. From a policy perspective, our results seem to suggest 
that the scope for a higher effectiveness of aid on stimulating growth is a 
                                                 
20 Although these results strike surprising, both of them have been reported by past studies that 
examined the impact of various government spending categories on growth for low-income 
countries. Both results are supported by Miller and Russek (1997), with the first result also found 
in Bose et al. (2003), and the second in Devarajan et al. (1996).   23
responsibility that lies with all sides from the wide spectrum encompassing the 
process of resource transfers, i.e., both recipients and donors. Taking them 
literally, our results propose that recipient countries should allocate the aid they 
receive on the most productive uses, while donors should make sure that aid 
provision is the least erratic possible. 
   Nevertheless,  although  suggestive,  our analysis, together with the previous 
studies on the foreign aid-economic growth nexus (e.g., Chatterjee et al 2003; 
Chatterjee and Turnovsky 2004, 2005; Obstfeld 1999), shares a fair number of 
limitations that make us cautious on claiming definite policy conclusions. One 
such restriction is that our analysis abstracts from the important issue of poverty 
reduction. Insofar as income transfers can alleviate, to some extent, the severely 
adverse effects resulting from situations of extreme poverty (i.e., high mortality 
rates, restrictions on undertaking costly activities that promote future 
productivity) then even aid given in the form of transfers may have beneficial 
growth and welfare effects. Another shortcoming – once more dictated by the 
need to keep the analysis tractable – is that we have considered the provision of 
aid and its distribution on different uses as exogenously given, without specifying 
any kind of preferences for either donors or recipients. To the extent that the 
inclusion of such preferences may result in strategic interactions in the decisions 
between donors and recipients, then the possibility of multiple equilibria may 
actually provide an explanation of why aid disbursements are volatile. Although 
these issues are not considered in our analysis, they may constitute a promising 
avenue for future research. 
 
References      
1.  Aghion, P., Angeletos, G.M., Banerjee, A., and Manova, K. 2005. 
Volatility and growth: credit constraints and productivity-enhancing 
investment. NBER Working Paper No. 11349 
2.  Alesina, A., and Weder, B. 2002. Do corrupt governments receive less 
foreign aid? American Economic Review, 92, 1126-1137   24
3.  Asiedu, E., and Villamil, A.P. 2002. Imperfect enforcement, foreign 
investment and foreign aid. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 6, 476-495 
4.  Beck, T., Lundberg, M., and Majnoni, G. 2001. Financial intermediary 
development and growth volatility: do intermediaries dampen or magnify 
shocks? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2707, World 
Bank 
5.  Blackburn, K., and Galindev, R. 2003. Growth, volatility and learning. 
Economics Letters, 79, 417-421 
6.  Blackburn, K., and Pelloni, A. 2004. On the relationship between growth 
and volatility. Economics Letters, 83, 123-127 
7.  Bleaney, M.F., Gemmell, N., and Kneller, R. 2001. Testing the endogenous 
growth model: public expenditure, taxation, and growth over the long run. 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 34, 36-57 
8.  Boone, P. 1996. Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid. European 
Economic Review, 40, 289-329. 
9.  Bose, N., Haque, M.E., and Osborn, D.R. 2003. Public expenditure and 
economic growth: a disaggregated analysis for developing countries. Centre 
for Growth and Business Cycles Research Discussion Paper No. 30, 
University of Manchester 
10. Bulir, A., and Hamann, A.J. 2003. Aid volatility: an empirical assessment. 
IMF Staff Papers, 50, 64-89  
11. Burnside, C., and Dollar, D. 2000. Aid, policies, and growth. American 
Economic Review, 90, 847-868 
12. Canton, E. 2002. Business cycles in a two-sector model of endogenous 
growth. Economic Theory, 19, 477-492 
13. Cardak, B.A. 2004. Education choice, endogenous growth and income 
distribution. Economica, 71, 57-81 
14. Chatterjee, S., and Turnovsky, S.J. 2004. Foreign aid and economic 
growth: The role of flexible labour supply. Working paper, University of 
Georgia    25
15. Chatterjee, S., and Turnovsky, S.J. 2005. Financing public investment 
through foreign aid: consequences for economic growth and welfare. 
Review of International Economics, 13, 20-44 
16. Chatterjee, S., Sakoulis, G., and Turnovsky, S.J. 2003. Unilateral capital 
transfers, public investment, and economic growth. European Economic 
Review, 47, 1077-1103 
17. Clemens, M., Radelet, S., and Bhavnani, R. 2004. Counting chickens when 
they hatch: the short-term effect of aid on growth. Centre for Global 
Development Working Paper No. 44, Washington D.C. 
18. Collier, P., and Dehn, J. 2001. Aid, shocks, and growth. World Bank 
Working Paper No. 2688 
19. Collier, P., and Dollar, D. 2002. Aid allocation and poverty reduction. 
European Economic Review, 45, 1470-1500 
20. Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. 2002. Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict 
societies. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2902 
21. Daalgard, C.J., and Hansen, H. 2001. On aid, growth and good policies. 
Journal of Development Studies, 37, 17-41 
22. Dalgaard, C.J., Hansen, H., and Tarp, F. 2004. On the empirics of foreign 
aid and growth. Economic Journal, 114, F191-F216 
23. de Hek, P.A. 1999. On endogenous growth under uncertainty. 
International Economic Review, 40, 727-744 
24. Devarajan, S., Swaroop, V., and Zou, H. 1996. The composition of public 
expenditure and economic growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 37, 
313-344 
25. Drazen, A. 2002. Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton (NJ): 
Princeton University Press 
26. Easterly, W. 2003. Can foreign aid buy growth? Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 17, 23-48 
27. Easterly, W., Levine, R., and Roodman, D. 2003. Aid, policies, and 
growth: comment. American Economic Review, 94, 774-780   26
28. Glomm, G., and Ravikumar, B. 1992. Public versus private investment in 
human capital: endogenous growth and income inequality. Journal of 
Political Economy, 100, 818-834 
29. Guillaumont, P., and Chauvet, L. 2001. Aid and performance: a 
reassessment. Journal of Development Studies, 37, 66-92 
30. Hansen, G. 1985. Indivisible labor and the business cycle. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 16, 309-327 
31. Hansen, H., and Tarp, F. 2000. Aid effectiveness disputed. Journal of 
International Development, 12, 375-398 
32. Hansen, H., and Tarp, F. 2001. Aid and growth regressions. Journal of 
Development Economics, 64, 547-570 
33. Kneller, R., and Young, Y. 2001. Business cycle volatility, uncertainty and 
long-run growth.  The Manchester School, 69, 534-552 
34. Kneller, R., Bleaney, M.F., and Gemmell, N. 1999. Fiscal policy and 
growth: evidence from OECD countries. Journal of Public Economics, 74, 
171-190 
35. Lensink, R., and Morrissey, O. 2000. Aid instability as a measure of 
uncertainty and the positive impact of aid on growth, Journal of 
Development Studies, 36, 31-49 
36. Lucas, R.E. Jr. 1988. On the mechanics of economic development. Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 22, 3-42 
37. Martin, P., and Rogers, C.A. 2000. Long-term growth and short-term 
economic instability. European Economic Review, 44, 359-381 
38. Miller, S.M., and Russek, F.S. 1997. Fiscal structures and economic 
growth: international evidence. Economic Inquiry, 35, 603-613 
39. Obstfeld, M. 1999. Foreign resource inflows, savings and growth, in K. 
Schmidt-Hebbel and L. Serven (eds.) The Economics of Savings and 
Growth, 107-146, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press 
40. Palage, S., and Robe, M.A. 2001. Foreign aid and the business cycle. 
Review of International Economics, 9, 636-668 
41. Palivos, T. 2001. Social norms, fertility and economic development. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25, 1919-1934   27
42. Ramey, G., and Ramey, V. 1995. Cross-country evidence on the link 
between volatility and growth. American Economic Review, 85, 1138-1151 
43. Razin, A. 1972. Optimum investment in human capital. Review of 
Economic Studies, 39, 455-460 
44. Roodman, D., 2004. The anarchy of numbers: aid, development, and cross-
country empirics. Centre for Global Development Working Paper No. 32, 
Washington D.C. 
45. Svensson, J. 1999. Aid, growth and democracy. Economics and Politics, 
11, 275-297 
46. Svensson, J. 2000. Foreign aid and rent-seeking. Journal of International 
Economics, 51, 437-461 
47. Uzawa, H. 1965. Optimum technical change in an aggregative model of 
economic growth. International Economic Review, 6, 18-31 
48. World Bank. 1998. Assessing aid: what works, what doesn’t, and why. 
World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
  
  
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   28
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
GDP p.c. growth rate   1.42  2.92  -8.65  11.97 
Initial p.c. GDP (log)  7.10  1.20  4.60  10.32 
Aid 5.81  7.11  -0.007  34.64 
Volatility of aid  2.07  3.07  0.007  27.53 
Productive  expenditures  14.76 7.03 4.04 49.8 
Unproductive  expenditures  12.47 7.87 2.18 52.2 
Budget deficit  3.55  6.03  -30.45  41.69 
Trade   69.75  44.82  12.55  329.75 
Tropical   0.53  0.50  0  1 
East Asia & Pacific  0.09  0.28  0  1 
Initial life expectancy (log)  4.09  0.17  3.61  4.33 
Notes: All variables are based on 9-year averages of the data. The variables aid, productive and 
unproductive expenditures, budget deficit, and trade are expressed as fractions of GDP. Initial 
GDP, and initial life expectancy enter in log form, while East Asia & Pacific and Tropical enter as 
0/1 dummies. 
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Table 2 
Basic Results 
  (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
GMM 
(5) 
GMM 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  0.248 
(0.339) 
0.097 
(0.743) 
-0.884 
(0.028) 
-1.09 
(0.001) 
-1.34 
(0.001) 
Aid 0.086 
(0.093)        
Aid volatility  -0.300 
(0.005)        
Aid * Productive expenditures    0.015 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.025) 
0.022 
(0.019) 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures    -0.018 
(0.051) 
-0.036 
(0.003) 
-0.031 
(0.056) 
-0.034 
(0.030) 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures    -0.074 
(0.000) 
-0.067 
(0.000) 
-0.060 
(0.024) 
-0.070 
(0.004) 
Aid volatility * Unproductive 
expenditures    0.087 
(0.000) 
0.096 
(0.000) 
0.068 
(0.044) 
0.080 
(0.011) 
Productive expenditures    0.001 
(0.977) 
-0.042 
(0.444) 
-0.133 
(0.005) 
-0.084 
(0.114) 
Unproductive expenditures    -0.073 
(0.141) 
-0.080 
(0.167) 
0.017 
(0.635) 
-0.009 
(0.816) 
Budget deficit     -0.104 
(0.099) 
-0.065 
(0.191) 
-0.077 
(0.202) 
Trade     0.010 
(0.151) 
0.019 
(0.002) 
0.016 
(0.008) 
Tropical     -0.886 
(0.035) 
-1.37 
(0.000) 
-1.34 
(0.000) 
East Asia & Pacific     2.79 
(0.000) 
2.94 
(0.000) 
3.03 
(0.000) 
Initial life expectancy (log)     8.63 
(0.002) 
7.73 
(0.000) 
10.69 
(0.000) 
Countries / Observations  74 / 190  70 / 137  67 / 126   52 / 107  49 / 99 
R
2 0.130  0.149  0.418  0.668  0.686 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value)      0.654  0.676 
C-statistic (p-value)        0.857 
Shea partial R
2   
Aid * Productive expenditures        0.668  0.668 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures      0.624  0.652 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures      0.607  0.615 
Aid volatility * Unproductive 
expenditures      0.637  0.679 
Initial GDP per capita (log)          0.719 
Productive expenditures          0.805 
Unproductive expenditures          0.782 
Budget deficit          0.610 
Trade         0.822 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors. Aid volatility measured as the standard 
deviation of aid. Constant term and time dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. 
Instruments in regression (4): dummies for Central America, African Franc Zone countries, and Egypt, 
lagged arms imports as a fraction of total imports, lagged aid and aid volatility and their interaction with 
lagged productive and unproductive expenditures, GDP interacted with productive and unproductive 
expenditures, population and its interaction with productive and unproductive expenditures, and population 
squared. Regression (5) adds as instruments: trade and initial GDP per capita, both lagged one period, and 
GDP squared interacted with productive and unproductive expenditures.   30
Table 3 
Testing the specification: additional controls 
 (1) 
GMM 
(2) 
GMM 
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
GMM 
(5) 
GMM 
(6) 
GMM 
(7) 
GMM 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -1.37 
(0.000) 
-1.07 
(0.001) 
-1.08 
(0.001) 
-1.00 
(0.001) 
-1.14 
(0.000) 
-0.903 
(0.011) 
-1.03 
(0.001) 
Aid * Productive expenditures  0.021 
(0.026) 
0.021 
(0.038) 
0.021 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.082) 
0.019 
(0.032) 
0.022 
(0.031) 
0.016 
(0.049) 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures 
-0.035 
(0.035) 
-0.029 
(0.093) 
-0.035 
(0.025) 
-0.019 
(0.246) 
-0.029 
(0.059) 
-0.025 
(0.120) 
-0.025 
(0.105) 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures 
-0.058 
(0.030) 
-0.058 
(0.032) 
-0.056 
(0.011) 
-0.050 
(0.115) 
-0.050 
(0.043) 
-0.057 
(0.049) 
-0.046 
(0.067) 
Aid volatility * Unproductive 
expenditures 
0.066 
(0.059) 
0.065 
(0.068) 
0.174 
(0.023) 
0.040 
(0.278) 
0.060 
(0.057) 
0.059 
(0.073) 
0.052 
(0.090) 
Productive expenditures  -0.129 
(0.008) 
-0.134 
(0.005) 
-0.117 
(0.010) 
-0.135 
(0.003) 
-0.129 
(0.005) 
-0.157 
(0.001) 
-0.135 
(0.026) 
Unproductive expenditures  0.021 
(0.600) 
0.015 
(0.691) 
-0.0003 
(0.991) 
-0.001 
(0.973) 
0.0008 
(0.978) 
0.011 
(0.747) 
0.020 
(0.585) 
Budget deficit  -0.091 
(0.076) 
-0.064 
(0.194) 
-0.055 
(0.209) 
-0.067 
(0.154) 
-0.046 
(0.321) 
-0.060 
(0.229) 
-0.055 
(0.265) 
Trade 0.021 
(0.001) 
0.018 
(0.003) 
0.018 
(0.001) 
0.010 
(0.076) 
0.018 
(0.001) 
0.014 
(0.025) 
0.020 
(0.001) 
Tropical   -1.39 
(0.000) 
-1.35 
(0.000) 
-1.34 
(0.000) 
-1.09 
(0.006) 
-1.38 
(0.000) 
-0.940 
(0.026) 
-1.41 
(0.000) 
East Asia & Pacific  3.22 
(0.000) 
2.93 
(0.000) 
2.80 
(0.000) 
2.80 
(0.000) 
2.41 
(0.000) 
2.42 
(0.000) 
2.91 
(0.000) 
Initial life expectancy (log)  7.49 
(0.000) 
7.66 
(0.000) 
6.55 
(0.001) 
7.76 
(0.000) 
4.12 
(0.125) 
9.81 
(0.000) 
7.14 
(0.000) 
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.013 
(0.112)         
Civil war    -0.200 
(0.770)        
Lagged civil war    0.174 
(0.802)        
Population growth rate     -0.474 
(0.034)        
Money      0.025 
(0.039)     
Initial fertility rate        -0.573 
(0.024)    
Latin America & Caribbean         -1.03 
(0.091)   
Aid squared           -0.0008 
(0.858) 
Countries / Observations  52 / 105  52 / 107  52 / 107  52 / 107  52 / 107  52 / 107  52 / 107 
R
2 0.672  0.670  0.685  0.685  0.690  0.668  0.669 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value)  0.627 0.654 0.827  0.573 0.731  0.694  0.549 
C-statistic (p-value)  0.466 0.686 0.879  0.996 0.824  0.917  0.205 
Shea partial R
2  
Aid * Productive expenditures  0.672  0.658  0.665  0.676  0.668  0.671  0.702 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures  0.607 0.611 0.632  0.613 0.626  0.606  0.617 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures  0.624 0.600 0.607  0.618 0.605  0.602  0.569 
Aid volatility * Unproductive 
expenditures  0.635 0.622 0.648  0.637 0.639  0.624  0.658 
Aid  squared           0.330 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors. Aid volatility measured as the standard deviation of aid. Constant term 
and time dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Instruments in regressions (1)-(7): as in Table 2 regression 
(4). Regression (7) also adds as instrument: lagged aid squared.   31
Table 4  
Testing the volatility measure: alternative definitions 
  (1) 
Volatility1 
(2) 
Volatility2 
(3) 
Volatility3 
(4) 
Volatility4 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -1.09 
(0.001) 
-1.20 
(0.001) 
-1.05 
(0.001) 
-1.07 
(0.000) 
Aid * Productive 
expenditures 
0.022 
(0.025) 
0.003 
(0.433) 
0.021 
(0.085) 
0.012 
(0.037) 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures 
-0.031 
(0.056) 
-0.016 
(0.018) 
-0.032 
(0.141) 
-0.020 
(0.093) 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures 
-0.060 
(0.024) 
-0.667 
(0.019) 
-0.155 
(0.233) 
-0.058 
(0.848) 
Aid volatility * Unproductive 
expenditures 
0.068 
(0.044) 
0.704 
(0.002) 
0.179 
(0.187) 
0.259 
(0.367) 
Productive expenditures  -0.133 
(0.005) 
0.085 
(0.361) 
-0.123 
(0.091) 
-0.169 
(0.033) 
Unproductive expenditures  0.017 
(0.635) 
-0.180 
(0.044) 
0.007 
(0.870) 
0.018 
(0.740) 
Budget deficit  -0.065 
(0.191) 
-0.101 
(0.013) 
-0.058 
(0.300) 
-0.042 
(0.458) 
Trade 0.019 
(0.002) 
0.021 
(0.000) 
0.019 
(0.002) 
0.016 
(0.003) 
Tropical   -1.37 
(0.000) 
-1.26 
(0.000) 
-1.44 
(0.000) 
-1.39 
(0.000) 
East Asia & Pacific  2.94 
(0.000) 
2.24 
(0.000) 
2.90 
(0.000) 
3.09 
(0.000) 
Initial life expectancy (log)  7.73 
(0.000) 
7.85 
(0.000) 
8.00 
(0.001) 
9.06 
(0.000) 
Countries / Observations  52 / 107  48 / 96  52 / 107  52 / 107 
R
2 0.668  0.652  0.655  0.665 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value)  0.654 0.546 0.624 0.714 
Shea partial R
2 
Aid * Productive 
expenditures  0.668 0.709 0.409 0.569 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures  0.624 0.798 0.422 0.508 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures  0.607 0.228 0.372 0.325 
Aid volatility * Unproductive 
expenditures  0.637 0.365 0.430 0.397 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors. Aid volatility measured as the 
standard deviation of aid in regression (1), the standard deviation of the detrended aid series in 
logarithm, using the Hodrick and Prescott filter in regression (2), the log[1+sd(aid)] in 
regression (3), the standard deviation of log(1+aid) in regression (4). Constant term and time 
dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Instruments in regressions (1)-
(4): as in Table 2 regression (4).  
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Table 5 
Testing the time intervals: alternative period averages 
 
(1) 
Cross section 
 
(2) 
Panel 
(9 year averages) 
(4) 
Panel 
(4 year averages) 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -1.23 
(0.000) 
-1.34 
(0.001) 
0.350 
(0.691) 
Aid * Productive 
expenditures 
0.051 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.019) 
0.034 
(0.089) 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures 
-0.110 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.030) 
-0.042 
(0.093) 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures 
-0.100 
(0.000) 
-0.070 
(0.004) 
-0.189 
(0.090) 
Aid volatility * 
Unproductive expenditures 
0.178 
(0.000) 
0.080 
(0.011) 
0.290 
(0.091) 
Productive expenditures  -0.042 
(0.019) 
-0.084 
(0.114) 
-0.163 
(0.028) 
Unproductive expenditures  0.027 
(0.193) 
-0.009 
(0.816) 
-0.198 
(0.178) 
Budget deficit  -0.090 
(0.000) 
-0.077 
(0.202) 
-0.406 
(0.070) 
Trade  0.014 
(0.000) 
0.016 
(0.008) 
0.023 
(0.003) 
Tropical   -0.371 
(0.002) 
-1.34 
(0.000) 
-1.60 
(0.001) 
East Asia & Pacific  2.14 
(0.000) 
3.03 
(0.000) 
2.71 
(0.000) 
Initial life expectancy (log)  5.14 
(0.000) 
10.69 
(0.000) 
3.55 
(0.368) 
Countries / Observations  23 / 23  49 / 99  70 / 269 
R
2 0.960  0.686  0.167 
Hansen J-statistic  
(p-value)  0.348 0.676  0.289 
C-statistic (p-value)  0.501 0.857  0.412 
Shea partial R
2 
Aid * Productive 
expenditures  0.826 0.668  0.142 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures  0.993 0.652  0.170 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures  0.915 0.615  0.080 
Aid volatility * 
Unproductive expenditures  0.999 0.679  0.073 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  0.983  0.719  0.220 
Productive expenditures  0.997  0.805  0.623 
Unproductive expenditures  0.999  0.782  0.177 
Budget deficit  0.993  0.610  0.055 
Trade 0.994  0.822  0.809 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors. Aid volatility measured as the standard 
deviation of aid. Constant term and time dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. 
Instruments in regressions (1)-(3): as in Table 2 regression (5). 
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Table 6 
Testing the recipients: sub-sample analysis 
 
(1) 
Low-income 
 
(2) 
Low-aid 
recipients 
 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -0.821 
(0.126) 
-1.10 
(0.008) 
Aid * Productive 
expenditures 
0.021 
(0.028) 
0.300 
(0.000) 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures 
-0.035 
(0.064) 
-0.379 
(0.000) 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures 
-0.056 
(0.012) 
-0.510 
(0.004) 
Aid volatility * 
Unproductive expenditures 
0.069 
(0.053) 
0.643 
(0.001) 
Productive expenditures  -0.135 
(0.124) 
-0.127 
(0.091) 
Unproductive expenditures  0.112 
(0.287) 
-0.037 
(0.508) 
Budget deficit  0.055 
(0.344) 
-0.145 
(0.002) 
Trade 0.017 
(0.232) 
0.008 
(0.056) 
Tropical   -1.12 
(0.021) 
-1.29 
(0.001) 
East Asia & Pacific  3.00 
(0.000) 
3.15 
(0.000) 
Initial life expectancy (log)  5.11 
(0.045) 
11.52 
(0.003) 
Countries / Observations  35 / 71  37 / 73 
R
2 0.620  0.756 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value)  0.715 0.477 
Shea partial R
2 
Aid * Productive 
expenditures  0.562 0.198 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures  0.558 0.285 
Aid volatility * Productive 
expenditures  0.645 0.171 
Aid volatility * 
Unproductive expenditures  0.662 0.257 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors. Aid 
volatility measured as the standard deviation of aid. Constant term and 
time dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. 
Instruments in regressions (1)-(2): as in Table 2 regression (4).  
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Table 7 
Testing the expenditures classification: disaggregating productive spending 
  (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
GMM 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -0.124 
(0.783) 
-1.13 
(0.046) 
-1.48 
(0.000) 
-1.52 
(0.000) 
Aid * Education 
expenditures 
0.082 
(0.037) 
0.113 
(0.358) 
0.395 
(0.000) 
0.412 
(0.001) 
Aid * Health expenditures  -0.064 
(0.445) 
-0.038 
(0.718) 
-0.339 
(0.000) 
-0.279 
(0.006) 
Aid * Transp. & com. 
expenditures 
0.043 
(0.253) 
0.025 
(0.668) 
-0.002 
(0.985) 
-0.089 
(0.487) 
Aid * Other productive 
expenditures 
-0.001 
(0.894) 
-0.016 
(0.704) 
-0.138 
(0.000) 
-0.135 
(0.001) 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures 
-0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.032 
(0.022) 
0.009 
(0.376) 
0.004 
(0.735) 
Aid volatility * Education 
expenditures 
-0.656 
(0.010) 
-0.466 
(0.203) 
-1.04 
(0.002) 
-0.930 
(0.036) 
Aid volatility * Health 
expenditures 
0.117 
(0.648) 
0.368 
(0.240) 
1.17 
(0.000) 
0.816 
(0.018) 
Aid volatility * Transp. & 
com. expenditures 
0.030 
(0.822) 
-0.150 
(0.400) 
-0.153 
(0.525) 
0.084 
(0.760) 
Aid volatility * Other 
productive expenditures 
0.047 
(0.491) 
0.092 
(0.437) 
0.403 
(0.000) 
0.307 
(0.017) 
Aid volatility * 
Unproductive expenditures 
0.142 
(0.002) 
0.066 
(0.220) 
-0.077 
(0.015) 
-0.037 
(0.493) 
Education expenditures  0.315 
(0.399) 
0.250 
(0.363) 
-0.128 
(0.350) 
-0.194 
(0.276) 
Health expenditures  0.279 
(0.364) 
0.030 
(0.914) 
-0.001 
(0.992) 
0.127 
(0.596) 
Transp. & com. 
expenditures 
-0.148 
(0.622) 
-0.425 
(0.059) 
-0.222 
(0.053) 
-0.238 
(0.158) 
Other productive 
expenditures 
-0.083 
(0.545) 
-0.110 
(0.312) 
-0.169 
(0.009) 
-0.027 
(0.801) 
Rest expenditures  -0.120 
(0.051) 
-0.062 
(0.411) 
0.021 
(0.544) 
-0.019 
(0.718) 
Budget deficit    -0.105 
(0.126) 
-0.117 
(0.001) 
-0.128 
(0.020) 
Trade    0.011 
(0.172) 
0.019 
(0.000) 
0.016 
(0.030) 
Tropical    -0.416 
(0.416) 
-0.991 
(0.001) 
-1.10 
(0.001) 
East Asia & Pacific    3.00 
(0.000) 
2.99 
(0.000) 
3.25 
(0.000) 
Initial life expectancy (log)    9.95 
(0.009) 
12.15 
(0.000) 
12.94 
(0.000) 
Countries / Observations  58 / 105  55 / 96  46 / 82  42 / 76 
R
2 0.222  0.492  0.683  0.683 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value)     0.655  0.554 
Shea partial R
2   
Aid * Education 
expenditures      0.623 0.452 
Aid * Health expenditures      0.716  0.704 
Aid * Transp. and com. 
expenditures      0.744 0.558 
Aid * Other productive      0.661  0.534   35
expenditures 
Aid * Unproductive 
expenditures     0.829  0.763 
Aid volatility * Education 
expenditures     0.534  0.430 
Aid volatility * Health 
expenditures     0.681  0.561 
Aid volatility * Transp. 
And com. expenditures     0.708  0.548 
Aid volatility * Other 
productive expenditures     0.640  0.560 
Aid volatility * 
Unproductive expenditures     0.788  0.500 
Initial GDP per capita (log)        0.780 
Education expenditures        0.890 
Health expenditures        0.888 
Transp. and com. 
expenditures      0.806 
Other productive 
expenditures      0.679 
Unproductive expenditures        0.768 
Budget deficit        0.636 
Trade       0.797 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors. Aid volatility measured as the standard deviation 
of aid. Constant term and time dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Instruments in 
regression (3): dummies for Central America, African Franc Zone countries, and Egypt, lagged aid and aid 
volatility and their interaction with lagged categories of productive and unproductive expenditures, population and 
its interaction with categories of productive and unproductive expenditures, population squared, GDP and its 
square interacted with categories of productive and unproductive expenditures. Regression (4) adds as 
instruments: trade and initial GDP per capita, both lagged one period. 
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Country and Data Appendix  
 
Country Sample (74) 
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo 
Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Dominican Rep., Egypt, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran,  
Israel, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Syrian Arab Rep., Tanzania,  Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen Rep., Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Table A1 
Variables Description and Sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
Basic Set 
GDP p.c. growth rate  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
based on constant local currency. 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Initial p.c. GDP  GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars.  World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Aid  Official development assistance and net official 
aid (% of GDP). 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Volatility of aid  Standard deviation of aid flows.  World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Productive expenditures  Sum of educational expenditures, health 
expenditures, transportation and communication 
expenditures, defense expenditures, housing 
expenditures, and general public services 
expenditures (% of GDP). 
International Monetary 
Fund, GFS 
Unproductive 
expenditures 
Sum of social security and welfare expenditures, 
recreation expenditures, economic services 
expenditures, and other unclassified expenditures 
(% of GDP). 
International Monetary 
Fund, GFS 
Budget deficit  Overall budget balance for central government (% 
of GDP). 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Trade   Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
(% of GDP). 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Tropical   Dummy indicating tropical location.  World Bank, Global 
Development Network  
East Asia & Pacific  Dummy indicating region.  World Bank  
Initial life expectancy  Life expectancy at birth, total.  World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Instruments Set 
Central America  Dummy for Central American countries.  World Bank 
Franc Zone  Dummy for African Franc Zone countries.  World Bank 
Egypt  Dummy for Egypt.   
Lagged arms imports  Lagged arms imports as a fraction of total 
imports. 
Roodman, D. (2004) 
Population  Population, total.  World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Sensitivity Set 
Ethnic fractionalization  Probability that two individuals belong to 
different ethnic groups. 
World Bank, Global 
Development Network  
Civil war  Dummy for civil war.  Clemens et al. (2004) and 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
Population growth rate  Annual population growth rate.  World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Money  Money and quasi-money, M2 (% of GDP).  World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Initial fertility rate  Fertility rate (births per woman), total.  World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
Dummy indicating region.  World Bank  
Volatility2  Standard deviation of logarithmic aid flows’ 
cyclical component, calculated using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter (λ = 100). Using λ = 10 does not 
alter the results. 
Author’s calculations 
Volatility3  Logarithm of one plus the standard deviation of 
aid. 
Author’s calculations 
Volatility4  Standard deviation of the logarithm of one plus 
aid. 
Author’s calculations 
Low-income countries  Low-income and low-middle-income countries.  World Bank  
Low aid-recipients  Recipients with lower than average aid.  Author’s calculations 
Low aid-volatility-
recipients 
Recipients with lower than average volatility of 
aid. 
Author’s calculations 
Notes: The classification of the productive and unproductive expenditures follow Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleaney et al. 
(2001). These expenditure data are consolidated and cover all levels of government.  